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Edward Said’s groundbreaking book, Orientalism (1978), moved well beyond 
previous studies of Occidental engagement with “the Orient”—for example, the 
classic work of Raymond Schwab, La renaissance orientale (1950). In his work, 
Said (1935–2003) undertook a wholesale analysis and critique of Western hegemonic 
domination of “the Orient” since the eighteenth century, not only politically and 
economically but culturally and intellectually. He did so through a Foucaultian and 
Gramscian analysis of the sociopolitical context of basic power imbalance in which 
European-American treatment, both in public media and in academic scholarship, of 
the non-Western world, especially the Near Eastern part of it, is seen as the 
handmaiden of Western imperialism, colonialism, and domination of the rest of the 
world—preeminently in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although it began 
much earlier.1 
His book is arguably the most important interpretive work of the late twentieth century 
regarding modern scholarly approaches to the non-Western world in general, and the Islamic and 
Arab Middle Eastern world specifically. As such it has become a standard point of reference in 
postcolonial and subaltern studies as well as in Middle Eastern, Indian, and other Asian studies 
fields, and it has had a major influence in all these areas. It has made “orientalism” into a 
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commonly used, negative shorthand designation for varied kinds of Western bias, chauvinism, 
and hegemonic motivation in conceiving and describing non-Western cultures and peoples, both 
within and beyond the academy. While Said’s subsequent writing on orientalism did not convey 
the same polemical tone or blanket condemnation as his critiques in Orientalism,2 the book’s all-
but-blanket indictment of Western treatment of “the Orient,” whether political or intellectual, has 
remained the primary touchstone for subsequent scholarly efforts to move beyond any 
imbrication with imperialist and colonialist attitudes and agendas in trying to interpret and 
understand any sector of the non-Western world. 
This being said, despite the brilliance of many of Said’s insights, his book is highly 
polemical in tone and correspondingly uneven and selective in its data and argumentation.3 Said 
rather indiscriminately threw together the accounts of Western travelers to the Orient and 
Western scholars of the Islamic world. He was often selectively unfair to individual Islamicists 
(from Sylvain Levi or Louis Massignon to Gustav von Grunebaum or H. A. R. Gibb). In his 
selection of European-American orientalist scholars to attack, he ignored (or was ignorant of) 
orientalists who did not fit his purposes. His apodictic, blanket censure of Western scholarly 
study of non-Western, especially Islamic, cultures was based almost solely on selected citations 
from a small, selected group of English and French Islamicists and Arabists.  
In what follows, we focus on some of the work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916–2000), 
one of those twentieth-century, anglophone “Western” scholars of “the Orient” whose scholarly 
critique of reductionist and chauvinistic orientalist scholarship in fact presaged Said’s arguments, 
but whose work Said either ignored or was unaware of. Not unlike Marshall G. S. Hodgson, 
perhaps the other most obvious American Islamic-studies scholar whom Said never mentions, 
Smith was arguably an “orientalist” who was delineating and practicing, long before Said’s 
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book, an approach to the Islamic and other Afro-Asian worlds of the classic “Orient” that was 
different from, and highly critical of, the kind of “orientalism” that Said’s blanket criticism 
would later stigmatize for all subsequent students of non-Western studies.  
It seems odd at first that Said would not have made some effort to mention orientalists who 
did not fit his paradigm, perhaps chief among them Smith, a Canadian who had had founded and 
directed McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies in the 1950s. Smith had spent six years 
during World War II teaching in a Christian missionary college in Lahore, in British-colonial 
northwest India (during which time he was working also on a doctorate in oriental studies at 
Cambridge University). His older brother Arnold, a Canadian career foreign service diplomat, 
capped his diplomatic career by becoming the first secretary general of the British 
Commonwealth in 1965. On the face of it, especially since Smith was by the 1970s a particularly 
prominent senior North American orientalist, what better counterexample or exception to Said’s 
“orientalist” establishment might he have found—a Western “orientalist” who was part of the 
Anglo-American Islamic-studies establishment, had family ties to the British Commonwealth 
establishment, and yet had also castigated the kind of hegemonic Western approaches to the 
Orient that Said inveighed against among Western orientalists?  
Nevertheless, if Said was aware of Smith, he gave no indication of it. Certainly Smith’s 
approach to Islamic or more generally to non-Western or “oriental” studies was not one that 
could have provided grist for Said’s mill. What Smith had to say in his own criticism of attitudes 
among Western interpreters of “the Orient” toward “oriental” individuals and groups in his 
lectures and writings over more than three decades before Said’s book appeared can be said to 
parallel the very kind of critique that Said makes, albeit from a very different perspective and in 
a different (decidedly not postmodern) idiom. (The same holds, as indicated above, for the 
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positions Marshall Hodgson took in his efforts to look at the worldwide history of Islamic 
peoples and to argue the nonexceptionalism of European civilization; Said apparently knew 
nothing of his publications or his singular teaching career at the University of Chicago, both of 
which were cut short by his untimely death a decade before the appearance of Orientalism). I 
want to think that Said simply did not even attempt to canvass the field of American oriental 
studies; otherwise, one would have to conclude that Smith and Hodgson were excluded from 
consideration simply because they did not fit his paradigm of hegemonic orientalist scholarship. 
Turning now to Wilfred Smith, I shall restrict myself in this brief exploration to considering 
Smith’s opera minora, his lesser-known essays and articles, rather than drawing on his major, 
longer studies that bear on Islamic studies and Western colonialism and imperialism, since the 
latter have been widely read and cited.4 To support my estimation of how little Smith’s work fits 
Said’s paradigm, I want to point briefly to some of the positions that Smith took that run counter 
to, or at least greatly complicate, the otherwise resolutely critical picture Said paints of 
prominent Western “orientalists” who studied and interpreted the non-West, its languages, 
cultures, politics, religions, and histories, going back at least to the late eighteenth century—and 
carried out their studies in the hegemonic context of Western societies that were systematically 
engaged in the despoilment, exploitation, colonization, and subjugation of non-Western societies 
around the world. 
First, in his young adulthood, until perhaps the end of World War II, Smith was strongly 
socialist, even Marxist, and pacifist in his own politics—tendencies that we may speculate were 
only heightened by what he experienced during his six years in the British imperial India of the 
early 1940s. As a budding historian of Islam and India, he saw the grave consequences there of 
the “merchant” and then “industrial capitalism” that had exploited India under the East India 
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Company and the British Raj. He was himself personally involved in some prepartition, Indian 
nationalist efforts to get rid of British rule, move beyond communalism, and find a way to a new, 
independent, unified India (he always regarded partition as a mistake and an unmitigated 
catastrophe). Smith’s first scholarly monograph treated Muslim political and religious 
movements during what was to be the final century of British rule in the subcontinent. This book 
was completed in the middle of his time in India, in 1943, and submitted as his Cambridge 
doctoral dissertation. However (as H. A. R. Gibb had warned him5), it was turned down when 
presented during the war, apparently because of its unvarnished anti-British sentiments.6 
Published nonetheless in Lahore in 1943 as Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis (2nd rev. 
ed., 1946), the book subsequently went through multiple editions and printings, the latest at least 
as recently as 2006. Although Smith, amid the ongoing disillusionments of communist 
dictatorships, abandoned his socialist and Marxist leanings, his moralist critique of Western 
imperialism, capitalism, and colonialism remained still strong in his writings of the 1950s and 
’60s especially. His first book had made clear above all that he would not make common cause 
with other orientalists in approaching the Orient, and Islam in particular, as a member of a 
Western tradition of either political and economic or intellectual hegemony, without a critical 
self-consciousness of that fact and a dedication to transcending it. 
The first note sounded by Smith in his postwar work that I want to point to is the rejection 
of any approach to Islamic, Hindu, or other Asian traditions that sees them as passive recipients 
or “victims” of a dominant “Western modernity” that has dealt them a blow either disrupting 
them or leading them to slavish imitation. In a paper, “Traditional Religions and Modern 
Culture” in 1968, he says: “The impact theory has been widely held, usually without argument, 
perhaps especially by Western administrators, by political scientists, and by economic-aid men. . 
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. . The impact idea often seems to suggest a somewhat massive assault under force of which the 
traditional system in this dichotomy is seen as reeling, bewildered, if not knocked down. . . . The 
impact metaphor also seems to suffer from a serious under-estimate of the dynamic, fluid quality 
of the so-called traditional religious systems.”7  
 The chauvinistic, hegemonic idea of the Western, or the Western Christian, world as 
dominant and active, the subject, and of the oriental world of whatever type as submissive and 
passive, the object of the West’s more “objective” knowledge and greater political power, is 
something that Edward Said later would associate strongly with “orientalism” in his book. More 
than two decades earlier than Said’s book and a decade before his just-cited paper, Smith had 
spelled this out in a different manner in an interesting 1955 address to the American Oriental 
Society, which was published a year later as “The Place of Oriental Studies in a Western 
University.”8 In this address, in terms remarkably parallel to what Said would argue some 
twenty-three years later, Smith makes clear the danger that he sees of American or any Western 
study of the “Orient” becoming complicit in supporting political, economic, or any other 
domination of that “Orient”: 
When an unexpected problem, an unfamiliar obstacle, confronts an ongoing activity, 
the universities are called upon to solve that problem, to manipulate that obstacle. 
It would be idle to deny that this principle underlies, and doubtless will continue to 
underlie, the stark and perhaps exhilarating expansion of oriental studies in our day. It 
is the source of money, of students, of whole new programs. But it would be equally 
idle to deny that it is full of danger, both to our studies and to the world. There is the 
danger of “being used”; of subordinating knowledge to policy, rather than vice versa. 
There is the subtler danger of acquiring seeming knowledge that is, in fact, false. For 
 7 
it happens to be a law of this universe in which we live that you cannot understand 
persons if you treat them as objects. You misinterpret a culture if you approach it in 
order to manipulate it. A civilization does not yield it secrets except to a mind that 
approaches it with humility and love. Knowledge pursued ad majorem Americae 
gloriam will, in the realm of oriental, as indeed in all human studies, fail to be sound 
knowledge. . . .  
 [A] university cannot glibly subordinate its study of the Orient to the pragmatic 
desire of its society to cope with the Orient operationally.9 
Here Smith points toward a second and enduring theme of his subsequent work, namely the 
imperative for the scholar not to objectify what or whom she or he studies. Later in the article he 
makes this more explicit:  
We shall have failed in our task as orientalists if our society continues to imagine that 
the problem is how we in the West can deal with the Orient. The practical problem is 
rather how man throughout the world can deal with the fact that he is separated from 
his neighbor by a cultural frontier.10 
Smith expands on what is wrong with this kind of objectification of other societies, 
traditions, or persons somewhat more clearly in an address that he gave at Colgate 
University in 1975:  
To treat persons objectively, as if they were objects, is not merely morally wrong, but 
is intellectually wrong. It does not lead to accurate or penetrating understanding. 
Hence the Western university does its work badly if it interprets Asia in purely 
objective, behaviourist, impersonalist terms, on the one hand, under the pretention of 
being “scientific,” or if, on the other hand, it simply presents it in its own Asian terms, 
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uninterpreted, receiving at face value and uncritically the self-understanding of an 
alien culture.11 
Over a decade earlier, Smith’s 1964 inaugural lecture at Harvard, “Mankind’s Religiously 
Divided History Approaches Self-consciousness,” had broached the concept of “corporate 
critical self-consciousness” as an antidote to objectification of other religious persons and 
traditions. Here he calls for those who study “other” religious traditions to recognize that 
henceforward whatever one says or writes can no longer be about “them” or even “you” as 
opposed to “us,” but only about “us” altogether as fellow human beings of all faiths and 
cultures.12 
A decade later, in a 1974 article, “Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: A New 
Proposal,”13 Smith expands on his solution to the problem of objectivizing the “other.” Here he 
argues again, but in greater detail, for the development of a “corporate critical self-
consciousness,” which he sees as essential to “humane studies,” and as “the proper goal of 
humane knowing.” He defines it as a rational, inductive, and communal understanding that is 
subject to a “valid verification procedure.” While his explicit definition of this understanding in 
the article is frankly somewhat impenetrable,14 he does go on in the article to elucidate more 
simply what he means by the term. There he indicates that, first, “corporate critical self-
consciousness” requires objective knowledge: namely, that in studying another culture or 
religious community, one must insure “that a first observer’s understanding has done justice to 
what is observed” by testing it against the experience of further observers. Second, such self-
consciousness involves the understanding “that no statement involving persons is valid . . . 
unless its validity can be verified both by the persons involved and by critical observers not 
involved.”15 In sum, this is a strong argument against the kind of objectification of the “other” 
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that Said identifies as typical if not universal in the work of Western scholars studying things 
“oriental.”  
A third theme of Smith’s work from the ’50s through the ’70s is also very much at variance 
with the “orientalist” hegemonic approach to the non-Western world that Said excoriates in his 
book. This is Smith’s objection to the idea, rooted in the evolutionary biases of the previous 
century of Western thought, that modernity is something being achieved by the Western world in 
the late nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries that should be, and is being, emulated 
by the most progressive elements in “the Orient.” Smith debunks this notion in several places, 
not least in his three 1964 Annual Lectures of the Indian Council of World Affairs at Sapru 
House, New Delhi, published in pamphlet form as “Modernization of a Traditional Society.”16 
Noting that “what ‘modern’ means is not really clear,”17 he goes on to question whether the 
“traditional [W]estern state” is really “modern” or perhaps itself now an outmoded model for a 
sovereign nation. Then he argues trenchantly that “India, or any non-[W]estern community 
cannot just copy the West in its transformations, and cannot even find the meaning or content of 
modernization by simply inquiring from the West.”18 Even though India can learn from the West, 
“India’s goal must be clearly an Indian goal, and the idea of imitating the West or imposing 
purely [W]estern solutions to India’s problem is distasteful or laughable.”19 He subsequently 
remarks on the multiple ways in which India’s circumstances differ from those in the West, even 
as he affirms that humanity is one, albeit a “multiform one.”20 He warns against treating 
“modernism” as a commodity to be acquired,21 and he also points out that there is no single 
Western answer to the question of modernization to give to India or anyone else, for 
modernization has become a global process transcending the West. Hence “the fully modern 
West is no longer [W]estern”22 at all but something more global: “The categories ‘Western’ and 
 10 
‘Oriental,’ or more accurately ‘Western,’ ‘Islamic,’ ‘Indian,’ ‘Far Eastern,’ etc., have been 
exceedingly important—it is my professional business to say how important. Yet they are today 
in the process of being superseded, however incipiently, by a new cosmopolitanism. . . . The 
modernization of the West cannot be defined in terms of the West’s future, for the West does not 
have a future of its own. It can look forward intelligently only to the [W]estern stand in the 
future of the world: a future that all of us must construct jointly, for good or ill.”23 
 This line of argument is augmented in the same essay by statements such as “Afro-Asian 
resurgence involves not only a throwing off of [W]estern political control but also a refusal to 
think in [W]estern ways,” following which he notes that that Afro-Asian “refusals” should not 
only be negative but involve active efforts to modernize on their own terms and, 
correspondingly, that Westerners must think of modernizing not only in old Western terms, but 
must rather develop a common global frame of reference within which to modernize.24 Again, 
Smith pushes toward a future in which any group anywhere should think of itself and everyone 
else globally in terms of “we,” not “we and they.” This is the antithesis of the hegemonic 
treatment of the non-Western world for which Said indicts the Western orientalist tradition. 
The fourth, and in many ways the clearest, testimony that I want to highlight from among 
Smith’s attempts to move beyond older “orientalist” paradigms of Western academic study of the 
Orient comes not from his writings so much as from his pragmatic work in creating the Institute 
of Islamic Studies at McGill on the principle that the study of anything Islamic in a non-Muslim 
institution must be pursued in conversation with, and under the critique of, Muslim as well as 
non-Muslim scholars. Smith led the Institute from its inception in 1952 until he left McGill for 
Harvard in 1964. (It is particularly fitting, I think, to end on this note, given that the conference 
for which this paper was prepared was held under McGill auspices on its campus; while Smith 
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pursued similar principles as director of the Center for the Study of World Religions from 1964 
to 1973, it was at McGill that he first tried to implement his approach.) Smith’s principle of 
demanding that there be mutual critique by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike of any 
analysis of things Islamic was evident from the outset in the makeup of the Institute’s 
membership. The ethos of the endeavor is well captured in a 1996 appreciation of Smith’s work 
at the Institute by McGill’s Salwa Ferahian: 
The Institute endeavors to offer to Westerners a serious encounter with a civilization 
other than their own. It recognizes that such an experience, in order to be valid, may 
require a creative modification of one’s own terms of reference. It strives to help 
Western students understand and appreciate an important, rich and varied civilization. 
To Muslims, the Institute aspires to offer an opportunity to study their own society in 
a serious, disciplined, scientific, and sympathetic environment, and to understand the 
international setting in which their society is currently involved and the problems that 
in modern times their faith must face. 
 The Institute was founded for the purpose of engaging in the serious study of the 
modern Muslim world. The innovative element was Smith’s conviction that this could 
not be done effectively by non-Muslims studying in a non-Muslim institution and 
without the participation of Muslims. The design for the Institute, including the design 
for the library, was the result of his creative response to the dilemma, as he saw it, of 
how to study Islam in a way that would involve Muslims and non-Muslims. 25 
Smith’s commitment to such an approach in studying Islam at McGill is also demonstrated 
vividly in his approach to the first major book that he completed in his years at McGill, Islam in 
Modern History (1967). He submitted each of his chapter drafts for this book as the text for 
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critical discussion in a session of a faculty seminar that included both Muslim and non-Muslim 
scholars currently at the university; he then made changes as needed on the basis of the 
discussions there.26  
The approach instituted by Smith at McGill exemplifies what I am describing as his 
rejection of (in Said’s terms) an “orientalist” orientation to the study of the history of religion in 
particular, which was, after all, at the heart of his work on both Islam and other religious 
traditions and cultures. This is clear from frequently cited references, both in his own work and 
in critiques and appreciations of his work, to “persons,” as opposed to “religions,” as the proper 
focus of historical and social inquiry. Near the end of his 1965 paper, “Traditional Religions and 
Modern Culture”27 (which was the first of Smith’s writings cited above), he delineates the proper 
scope of the study of religion by averring that “the subject matter of our study . . . is not merely 
tradition, but faith; not merely the overt manifestations of man’s religious life, but that life 
itself.”28 He goes on to say, “my entire thesis can be summed up in the phrase, that the study of 
religion must be fundamentally a study of persons.”29 He makes clear in a short 1979 essay, 
“Thinking about Persons,” that by “person” he does not mean “individual,” “for the fact is that 
the individual becomes a person only in community. And a society becomes a community only 
through being personal.”30 He goes on to note that older outlooks, Western or Eastern, were 
characterized by a coherence or integrity in which the natural, the personal, and the transcendent 
orders were perceived as “part of a total pattern”; it has been the rise of “objectivism” in modern 
science in the West that has fractured that integration, and it is now imperative in the light of the 
crises of our time (he mentions the nuclear threat and oceanic pollution as examples) to deal with 
the lack of integrity and coherence in our approach to the world. Of possible solutions to the 
problem, Smith’s choice is “to pursue integration through a larger rationality—available to us, I 
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believe, through a study of human history: an intellectual vision, of wholeness, within which the 
scientific is a component explicitly subordinate, and partial, and even inadequate, yet important; 
in which the personal, done full justice, is central; and for which the realm of value, though 
higher than we, is recognized as real, and is rendered intelligible, and apprehensible, even if not 
(in our finitude) fully comprehensible.”31 
This personal emphasis is ubiquitous in Smith’s writings, and it has been widely 
misconstrued to mean unscientific subjectivity rather than scientific objectivity, something that 
he, dedicated rationalist that he was, would never have dreamed of suggesting. I would argue that 
one of the things he was trying to get at with this emphasis is specifically the problem of 
objectification of the human “other” whom he as an orientalist scholar had dedicated his life to 
studying. He was convinced at a very deep level that any humane study of a Muslim, or Hindu, 
or any religious or cultural “other” (even including any “other” in our own society and culture) 
requires more than some imagined objective knowledge to do justice to him or her. It is precisely 
the objectification and the subordination to “our” higher Western scientific knowledge of the 
Orient and the oriental “other” later inveighed against by Edward Said that Smith also saw as 
dangerous and dehumanizing—not only to the “oriental” being objectified, but to the 
objectivizing occidental scholar, because of the inherent distortion and intellectual dishonesty of 
such an approach. As he put it in the passage cited earlier, “the Western university does its work 
badly if it interprets Asia in purely objective, behaviourist, impersonalist terms.” 
In this, Smith was in a very real sense arguing for scholarly study that could transcend the 
limitations of the orientalist approach that he himself must surely have seen as rightly excoriated 
by Said.32 Like Said, Smith had from the outset of his career, and primarily in the Indian rather 
than the Palestinian context, seen the linkage between Western economic and political intrusion 
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into the Orient and the damaging force of an objectifying, much less than fully humane, 
scholarship focused on the indigenous cultural and religious traditions of that same Orient. Of 
course his book, Modern Islam in India, testifies to this, as did his anticolonial activism in India 
and, ultimately, his much-referenced “personalist” approach to Muslims, their faith and tradition 
and the wider world of Islamic cultures and civilization. The objectifying, culturally imperialist 
“orientalism” attacked so tellingly by Edward Said could hardly be said to be something Smith 
ever tolerated, let alone represented or fell prey to; in fact he actively fought against it, as the 
preceding should have demonstrated. It is unfortunate that Smith and Said apparently never 
shared with one another their very similar indictments of many lamentable strands of Western 
orientalism. 
Notes 
1. As seen in comments Said makes at the outset in Orientalism, such as: Orientalism is “a 
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (p. 3), and 
“The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of 
varying degrees of a complex hegemony.” (p. 5). Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1978). 
2. Notably his much subtler book, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993). 
3. Not to mention the excessive repetition and generally sloppy editing of the book, which 
is particularly curious given the excellence and precision typical of Said’s large corpus of 
scholarship otherwise. 
4. E.g., Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India (Lahore: Ripton Printing Press, 
1945) and Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), The 
Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1962), etc. 
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5. Personal oral communication of W. C. Smith, ca. 1982. 
6. Smith went to Princeton after the war and earned his PhD with a thesis on the content of 
the Majallat al-Azhar, the monthly journal of Al-Azhar in Cairo. 
7. Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of the International Association for the 
History of Religions (held at Claremont, CA, September 1965), vol. 1: The Impact of Modern 
Culture on Traditional Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. 55–72.  
8. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “The Place of Oriental Studies in a Western University,” 
Diogenes 16 (Winter, 1956), pp. 104–11. 
9. Ibid., pp. 108–9. 
10. Ibid., p. 109. 
11. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “The Role of Asian Studies in the American University,” 
plenary address of the New York State Conference for Asian Studies, Colgate University, 
October 10–12, 1975 (published in pamphlet form with support from the Fund for the Study of 
the Great Religions of the World, Colgate University, 1976), pp. 9–10. 
12. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Mankind’s Religiously Divided History Approaches Self-
Consciousness,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 29 (1966), pp. 1–17. 
13. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: A New Proposal,” 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 4th ser., 12 (1974), pp. 81–102. 
14. “that critical, rational, inductive self-consciousness by which a community of persons, 
constituted at a minimum by two persons, the one being studied and the one studying, but ideally 
by the whole human race, is aware of any given particular human condition or action as a 
condition or action of itself as a community, yet of one part but not of the whole of itself; and is 
aware of it as it is experienced and understood simultaneously both subjectively (personally, 
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existentially) and objectively (externally, critically, analytically; as one used to say, 
scientifically).” Ibid., (84).  
15. Ibid., p. 84. 
16. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modernization of a Traditional Society (New York: Asia 
Publishing House, 1965). 
17. Ibid., p. 7.  
18. Ibid., p. 12. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid., p. 13. 
21. Ibid., p. 18. 
22. Ibid., p. 15.  
23. Ibid., pp. 15–16.  
24. Ibid., p. 43.  
25. Salwa Ferahian, “W. C. Smith Remembered,” MELA [Middle East Librarians 
Association] Notes, no. 64 [1996], viewed October 31, 2009, at the unpaginated website: 
http://www.mela.us/MELANotes/MELANotes64/toc64.html.  
26. Personal communications in conversation with Herbert L. Bodman (who had taught 
previously at McGill with Smith) at UNC–Chapel Hill and with W. C. Smith in Cambridge, MA, 
both in the late 1960s. 
27. Smith, Impact on Traditional Religions, pp. 68–72. 
28. Ibid., p. 68. 
29. Ibid., pp. 71–72. 
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30. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Thinking about Persons,” Humanitas: Journal of the Institute 
of Man 15, no. 2 (May, 1979), p. 148. 
31. Ibid., p. 152.  
32. Here this author has to confess to an inability to remember any specific confirmation of 
this from discussions with Smith after his 1978 return to Harvard (and an adjacent office in the 
Study of Religion) from Dalhousie. I do remember Smith’s general approval of the positive 
review of Said’s book by Albert Hourani at the time. 
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